雅思閱讀怎樣才算精讀

雅思閱讀中詞匯、結(jié)構(gòu)、寫(xiě)作背景…你真的精讀了那些真題的文章嗎?一起來(lái)學(xué)習(xí)一下吧，下面小編就和大家分享，來(lái)欣賞一下吧。

雅思閱讀 怎樣才算精讀?

精讀是什么?有些同學(xué)覺(jué)得做好標(biāo)記就可以，有些同學(xué)覺(jué)得是把握文章的主旨和態(tài)度，還有些同學(xué)覺(jué)得是要在雅思閱讀中抓住所有細(xì)節(jié)。讀法當(dāng)然人各有志，然而雅思考試是有題庫(kù)的，現(xiàn)有的真題文章是我們最好的訓(xùn)練材料，精讀作為一種好的閱讀習(xí)慣，需要耐心地培養(yǎng)。

那么，怎么樣才算精讀了一篇閱讀真題呢?你可以參考這兩個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：

1、 不要求每個(gè)單詞都背下來(lái)，但對(duì)重要位置上的生詞應(yīng)在查閱好以后記錄，關(guān)鍵句和長(zhǎng)難句要對(duì)照著翻譯出來(lái)。打個(gè)比方，這不是讓你把100多集的連續(xù)劇每集都背下來(lái)，而是讓你復(fù)述情節(jié)發(fā)展的線索，而這離不開(kāi)對(duì)生詞節(jié)點(diǎn)的打通。

2、 讀懂文章主旨、作者態(tài)度和寫(xiě)作結(jié)構(gòu)，對(duì)寫(xiě)作背景有所準(zhǔn)備。從雅思標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中可以看出，做對(duì)題目要求深刻的理解，所以基礎(chǔ)不好或者詞匯量低的同學(xué)更應(yīng)該把握文章大意，而提高方法也在于用精讀好好訓(xùn)練自己。

雖然考場(chǎng)上沒(méi)看懂一個(gè)例子或者一個(gè)長(zhǎng)句，可能最后也不影響你做對(duì)題目，但是不掌握邏輯走錯(cuò)方向的情況還是挺多的。因此希望大家克服怕麻煩的心理，備戰(zhàn)閱讀。

這具體的方法論，小編在這里給大家奉上劍橋雅思真題精講里的做法：

首先你可以列出篇章結(jié)構(gòu)：這是一篇什么主題的文章?考察的重點(diǎn)是信息大意還是歸納總結(jié)?里面出現(xiàn)的題型有哪些?有了最基礎(chǔ)的了解，你就可以將它分類(lèi)在筆記本里，然后進(jìn)一步解讀：這篇文章主要講了一個(gè)什么故事，或者探討了什么問(wèn)題。如果有條件，利用詞典把剛才不明白的地方搞懂，大致能翻譯出來(lái)主要情節(jié)。

接著，你可以把讀懂這篇文章時(shí)用到的必要詞匯和詞組摘錄下來(lái)，加以背誦;如果讀懂對(duì)你來(lái)說(shuō)不是問(wèn)題，那你就在這些詞匯的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行拓展，爭(zhēng)取多接觸到高頻詞。

然后就是重要的難點(diǎn)解析了，把文本里自己讀不懂的句子，或者中心段落進(jìn)行整體的翻譯，看看它們和答案直接存在著怎樣的聯(lián)系。一方面就鍛煉了你的翻譯水平，一方面也讓你了解了出題思路，是一種綜合性的訓(xùn)練。

最后，再把自己的錯(cuò)題記錄下來(lái)，但不要把正確答案標(biāo)在一邊——復(fù)習(xí)時(shí)你就可以再重新思考一下，不走進(jìn)同樣的謬誤了。

畢竟雅思閱讀考察的大部分題目都是指向中心的，所以大規(guī)模地泛讀不是很能提高分?jǐn)?shù)。希望大家都能利用精讀法訓(xùn)練自己，在考場(chǎng)上飛快抓住文章中關(guān)鍵詞讀懂文章內(nèi)容，考出好成績(jī)。

雅思考試閱讀理解備考輔導(dǎo)

The screw tightens

ONE can almost hear the gates clanging: one after the other the sources of funding for Europe’s banks are being shut. It is a result of the highly visible run on Europe’s government bond markets, which today reached the heart of the euro zone: an auction of new German bonds failed to generate enough demand for the full amount, causing a drop in bond prices (and prompting the Bundesbank to buy 39% of the bonds offered, according to Reuters).

Now another run—more hidden, but potentially more dangerous—is taking place: on the continents’ banks. People are not yet queuing up in front of bank branches (except in Latvia’s capital Riga where savers today were trying to withdraw money from Krajbanka, a mid-sized bank, pictured). But billions of euros are flooding out of Europe’s banking system through bond and money markets.

At best, the result may be a credit crunch that leaves businesses unable to get loans and invest. At worst, some banks may fail—and trigger real bank runs in countries whose shaky public finances have left them ill equipped to prop up their financial institutions.

To make loans, banks need funding. For this, they mainly tap into three sources: long-term bonds, deposits from consumers, and short-term loans from money markets as well as other banks. Bond issues and short-term funding have been seizing up as the panic over government bonds has spread to banks (which themselves are large holders of government bonds). This blockage has been made worse by tighter capital regulations that are encouraging banks to cut lending (instead of raising capital).

Markets for bank bonds were the first to freeze. In the third quarter bonds issues by European banks only reached 15% of the amount they raised over the same period in the past two years, reckon analysts at Citi Group. It is unlikely that European banks have sold many more bonds since.

Short-term funding markets were next to dry up. Hardest hit were European banks that need dollars to finance world trade (more than one third of which is funded by European banks, according to Barclays). American money market funds, in particular, have pulled back from Europe. Loans to French banks have plunged 69% since the end of May and nearly 20% over the past month alone, according to Fitch, a ratings agency. Over the past six months, it reckons, American money market funds have pulled 42% of their money out of European banks. European money market funds, too, continue to reduce their exposure to France, Italy and Spain, according to the latest numbers from Fitch.

雅思考試閱讀理解備考輔導(dǎo)

The euro zone's unexploded ordnance is no longer nuclear

THE euro-zone crisis is not solved and is not likely to be solved soon, but the greatest immediate danger has been avoided. Two points worth stressing.

1) The euro-zone economy has some "unexploded ordinance" in it that is likely to explode eventually, but no one really knows whether it is a grenade, a 1000kg bomb, or a nuclear device; what leaders did last week and are doing this week is making sure it is NOT a nuclear device.

Europe still faces a number of vortices that could pull down the euro zone if allowed to get going: the "Greek" austerity-budget deficit vortex, and the "Lehman vortex" that sucked Dexia below water, as per the diagram below.

However, euro-zone leaders seen to have finally rendered the worst vortex inoperable, namely the "Irish" vortex where by shocks pull down banks, banks pull down governments and then the vortex spreads to the next government in line. In this case it would have been Greek restructuring pulling down banks that forced nationalisation that forced downgrades that drove up yields which then made the governments insolvent. As this might rapidly have reached Italy and Spain, the "nuclear" outcome was truly scary—the sort of thing that had Charles Wyplosz talking about 1930s-like outcomes.

The first revelation is that they have now finally admitted that backstopping the banks is absolutely essential, mostly via recapitalisation. I’d guess that they’ll flub the job at the EU and G20 summits but that doesn’t really matter. They are now at "battle stations" when it comes to the banks, so we won’t have a Lehman-like moment that then brings down the world’s third largest debtor (Italy). Either national governments, or the EFSF will make sure the banks remain intact regardless.

The second revelation is that regardless of what they do to scale up the EFSF, it won’t be big enough to backstop sovereigns in a way that will prevent contagion. However, this doesn’t matter as the ECB will be forced to step in—just as it did in August and for exactly the same reason. Contagion spreading to Italy, Spain, Belgium, Malta, France etc would spell a very rapid and very ugly end to the euro zone. Besides, they have the ready excuse that they employed in August about orderly markets and monetary policy. But not all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds. The law of unintended consequences will be fully enforced.

2) Their half-hearted solution on the banks will almost surely lead to a recession. The most likely outcome is that the bank recapitalisation scheme gives Europe’s stronger banks a chance to create a credit crunch instead of taking government money. This is especially true since German banks are resisting both forcible recapitalisation and further write-down of Greek debts. The euro-zone governments are probably going to insist on the former but not on the latter. As the figure above shows, the recession is likely to start up all three of the vortices again, so we’ll be back at the drawing board in a few month’s time. But at least we’ll have avoided a truly historic crisis. Now let’s just hope the Greek street plays along with the role assigned to them this weekend. If euro-zone leaders don’t do enough to help the Greeks—to make sure they see a light at the end of the tunnel—we may see political chaos and a disorderly default that would severely test my hypotheses that the nuclear-threat has been removed.